In People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d 62, 908 N.E.2d 1, 330 Ill. Dec. 149 (2009), our supreme court held that a trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to rule on a defendant's motion to bar the admissibility of his prior convictions where the court had sufficient information to make a ruling. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 73. Where a trial court's refusal to rule is not based on any specific facts, but instead, is a blanket policy to withhold ruling until after the defendant testifies, the court has abused its discretion by refusing to exercise any discretion. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 74. The Illinois supreme court held that "a trial court's failure to rule on a motion in limine on the admissibility of prior convictions when it has sufficient information to make a ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion." However, our supreme court also held that a defendant fails to preserve for appeal the issue of the trial court's refusal to rule on the admissibility of his prior convictions, when the defendant does not testify at trial. The Court held that a trial court's failure to rule on a motion in limine on the admissibility of prior convictions when it has sufficient information to make a ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 73 (2009). The Patrick court added that "in all but the most complicated cases, a judge will have enough information before trial to weigh the probative value of admitting the prior conviction against the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant." Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 73 (2009). Moreover, in determining whether a trial court error of this sort is harmless, the Patrick court did not analyze whether the trial court's ultimate ruling on the admissibility of the prior convictions was correct, or whether the evidence overwhelmingly supported the guilty verdict. See Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 82 (2009) (Burke and Freeman, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Instead, the Patrick court concluded the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because: "Patrick was unjustifiably required to make a tactical decision without the ability to evaluate the impact it would have on his defense. Patrick's counsel was unable to inform the jury whether Patrick would testify and was anticipatorily unable to disclose Patrick's prior convictions to lessen the prejudicial effect the convictions would have on his credibility. As a result, Patrick was substantially prejudiced." Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 75 (2009). The Patrick court also concluded that Patrick's decision whether to testify was critical because he relied on a theory of self-defense. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d at 75 (2009).