In People v. Rosemond, 339 Ill. App. 3d 51, 790 N.E.2d 416, 274 Ill. Dec. 40 (2003), the Court determined that the State was not entitled to present polygraph evidence to rebut evidence that the State characterized as coercive. The Court explained that the State, not defense counsel, elicited details about the defendant's emotional reaction to the detective's actions of popping his fingers in the defendant's face during interrogation and the detective's statements that the defendant was a gang member and that he hated gang members. The Court noted that the jury could have concluded that defendant's confession was reliable based on facts elicited through the testimony of the State's witnesses. Rosemond, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 61-63. In Rosemond, this court also found that the error in admitting the polygraph evidence was exacerbated by the jury instructions. Rosemond, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 63. The instruction in that case advised the jury as follows: "'You have heard testimony concerning a polygraph test. The results of any polygraph examination are not admissible as evidence and should not be considered by you in any way. You should not speculate upon the nonexistence of results on the issue of defendant's guilt or innocence. The evidence is to be considered solely for the purpose of determining the credibility and reliability of any subsequent statements.'" Rosemond, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 63. The Court determined that this nonpattern instruction was improperly submitted to the jury. The Court explained that the defendant never alleged that coercive police conduct impaired the reliability or truthfulness of his statement and, therefore, it was not proper for the jury to be instructed to consider the polygraph evidence for those purposes. Rosemond, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 64. The Rosemond court held that: "Before a trial court allows the State to introduce polygraph evidence at trial under the Jefferson exception, the trial court should apply enhanced scrutiny to ensure that any references to a polygraph are necessary and of minimal prejudicial impact and that no other appropriate alternative impeachment evidence is available to the State. In addition, the trial court must formulate a clear cautionary instruction for the jury." Rosemond, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 61.