In Stenstrom Petroleum Services Group. Inc. v. Mesch, 375 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1089, 874 N.E.2d 959, 314 Ill. Dec. 594 (2007), the trial court enjoined the defendant for six months after he left the plaintiffs employment under the terms of their restrictive covenant. Stenstrom, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 1087. On appeal, Stenstrom contended that the six months should have commenced as of the date the preliminary injunction was entered because otherwise, the injunction would apply to conduct that had already occurred, and it was entitled to the full six-month period of noncompetition for which it bargained. Stenstrom, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 1087-88. In so arguing, Stenstrom relied upon the Fourth District's opinion in Prairie Eve Center, Ltd. v. Butler, 329 Ill. App. 3d 293, 768 N.E.2d 414, 263 Ill. Dec. 654 (2002). In that case, the defendant entered into a two-year covenant not to compete. Prairie Eve Center, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 295. The trial court, after finding the covenant valid and enforceable, entered a preliminary injunction in 1999, finding that the defendant repeatedly violated his covenant not to compete. Prairie Eve Center, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 296. Following trial, the court entered a permanent injunction in 2000, in which it extended the restrictive covenant by two years. Prairie Eve Center, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 298. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment, additionally finding that the language of the covenant provided for an extension of the restriction upon proof of its breach. Prairie Eve Center, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 304-05.