Prior to Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1, 75 Ill. Dec. 211 (1983), the supreme court adhered to the so-called "impact" rule in determining whether damages for negligent infliction of emotion distress could be recovered by the direct victims of defendants' negligence and by the bystanders to defendants' negligent act. Pursuant to the impact rule, direct victims and bystanders could recover damages if they suffered emotional distress and a "contemporaneous physical injury or impact." Rickey, 98 Ill. 2d at 553. In Rickey, the supreme court abandoned its adherence to the impact rule in bystander cases, stating: "The standard that we substitute for the one requiring contemporaneous injury or impact is the standard which has been adopted in the majority of jurisdictions where this question of recovery by a bystander for emotional distress has been examined. That standard has been described as the zone-of-physical-danger rule. Basically, under it a bystander who is in a zone of physical danger and who, because of the defendant's negligence, has reasonable fear for his own safety is given a right of action for physical injury or illness resulting from emotional distress. This rule does not require that the bystander suffer a physical impact or injury at the time of the negligent act, but it does require that he must have been in such proximity to the accident in which the direct victim was physically injured that there was a high risk to him of physical impact. The bystander, as stated, must show physical injury or illness as a result of the emotional distress caused by the defendant's negligence." Rickey, 98 Ill. 2d at 555.