In People v. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d 198, 203, 784 N.E.2d 784, 787, 271 Ill. Dec. 230 (2003), defendant was convicted of reckless homicide after his vehicle hit an oncoming vehicle while he was driving under the influence of alcohol. A nonpattern jury instruction was given based on section 9-3(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/9-3(b) (West 2000)). The instruction stated that if the jury found that the defendant was operating his vehicle under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident, it was to presume that the defendant acted recklessly unless disproved by contrary evidence. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 202, 784 N.E.2d at 787. The statute provided: "'In cases involving reckless homicide, being under the influence of alcohol or any other drug or drugs at the time of the alleged violation shall be presumed to be evidence of a reckless act unless disproved by evidence to the contrary.'" Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 202, 784 N.E.2d at 787, quoting 720 ILCS 5/9-3(b) (West 2000). In resolving the defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of section 9-3(b), our supreme court looked at a prior version of section 9-3(b), which read: "'In cases involving reckless homicide, being under the influence of alcohol or any other drug or drugs at the time of the alleged violation shall be prima facie evidence of a reckless act.'" Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 204, 784 N.E.2d at 788, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 9-3(b).