In Townsend v. University of Chicago Hospitals, 318 Ill. App. 3d 406, 408, 741 N.E.2d 1055, 251 Ill. Dec. 877 (2001), the plaintiff contended an imaging study should have been performed in the emergency room to diagnose a urinary tract obstruction. Dr. Leslie and Dr. Hancock, plaintiff's experts, both testified the defendant deviated from the standard of care. When Dr. Leslie was asked what the defendant would have done if she had complied with the standard of care and immediately ordered an imaging study, Dr. Leslie said "she would call another type of physician once she made the diagnosis." On cross-examination, Dr. Leslie said an imaging test would have increased Puckett's chance of survival, even if it may not have saved her life. Dr. Hancock testified Puckett's chance of survival would approach zero without having the obstruction removed. She would have had a 40 to 60 percent survival rate if the obstruction had been diagnosed and treated in the emergency room. On cross-examination, the defendant's attorney asked Dr. Hancock the following questions: "Q: Now, it's your opinion that had she the defendant ordered this test, a kidney stone might have been seen right? A: It might have been seen at the location of the stone of the ureter found at Puckett's autopsy. Q: You further testified that if it had been identified, it would require immediate attention, correct? A: Yes. Q: You're not the type of doctor that would provide that next intervention, are you? A: No, that's correct. Q: What type of doctor would do that? A: One of two types, a urologist or an interventional radiologist. Q: Both of which are outside your area of expertise, correct? A: Yes." Considering Aguilera, we asked whether the record contained any evidence to support the opinion of the plaintiff's experts that the negligent delays--an imaging test or transferring Puckett to the emergency room-- "'lessened the effectiveness of treatment?'" Townsend, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 412, quoting Aguilera, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 974. Because there was no expert testimony that an earlier imaging test or an earlier transfer to an intensive care unit would have led to surgical intervention or other treatment that may have contributed to Puckett's recovery, we concluded the jury was left to speculate about proximate cause. Townsend, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 412. Simply saying Puckett's chances of survival would go from 0% to 60% if "relief" had been provided did not address the causation gap. The Court vacated the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff and remanded the cause to the trial court with directions to enter judgment in favor of the defendant. Townsend, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 412.