In Torcasso v. Standard Outdoor Sales, Inc., 157 Ill. 2d 484, 626 N.E.2d 225, 193 Ill. Dec. 192 (1993) a claim was based upon an alleged breach of a brokerage agreement arising out of the failure to procure a lessee for certain property. a prior suit between the parties had involved a claim for recovery of a commission due under the terms of the same brokerage contract. Notwithstanding the fact that the two actions involved the same contract, as in the case before us, the supreme court held that they were not the same causes of action for res judicata purposes, noting that the transactions and time periods were different and facts required to prove the first cause of action were not similar circumstances applicable to the proofs necessary for the second cause of action. the same patterns existed in Baird & Warner, Inc. v. Addison Industrial Park. Inc., 70 Ill. App. 3d 59, 387 N.E.2d 831, 26 Ill. Dec. 1 (1979) (claims which arose out of the same contract, but involved separate transactions); and Stratemeyer v. West, 136 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 484 N.E.2d 399, 91 Ill. Dec. 840 (1985) (individual transactions were identifiable in the master agreement between the parties, but were separate and distinct, precluding application of res judicata).