Chiles v. Machine Shop, Inc

In Chiles v. Machine Shop, Inc, Mich App; NW2d (Docket no. 207395, released November 5, 1999), the plaintiff suffered from a back injury. When the plaintiff was cleared of physical work restrictions he was permanently laid off. The plaintiff's supervisor purportedly said that the plaintiff was not given certain jobs for which he was qualified because these jobs required a "strong back." The plaintiff brought a claim under the PWDCRA claiming that his employer wrongfully perceived him as suffering from a disability. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim that the supervisor's reference to a "strong back" was sufficient to show that the employer perceived the plaintiff as disabled, the Court held: Although this claim may at first appear easier to establish since a plaintiff need not actually be disabled to fall within the PWDCRA, a plaintiff must still prove that the employer perceived that the employee was actually "disabled" within the meaning of the statute. See Colwell v. Suffolk Co Police Dpt, 158 F3d 635, 646 (CA 2, 1998) (interpreting the ADA). In other words, showing that an employer thought that a plaintiff was somehow impaired is not enough; rather, a plaintiff must adduce evidence that a defendant regarded the plaintiff as having an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity--just as with an actual disability. Chiles, supra at 6. Because the plaintiff in Chiles, supra failed to present evidence that the employer actually believed that the plaintiff's back ailment was something more than temporary in nature, the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the employer perceived that the plaintiff was actually disabled as that term is defined under the PWDCRA. In Chiles v. Machine Shop, Inc, Mich App; NW2d (Docket no. 207395, released November 5, 1999), the Court adopted a three-part test to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant perceived the plaintiff as being disabled within the meaning of the PDCRA: First, we consider whether respondent's complaint was a physical impairment. Second, we identify the life activity upon which respondent relies . . . and determine whether it constitutes a major life activity . . . Third, tying the two statutory phrases together, we ask whether the impairment substantially limited the major life activity. Chiles, supra at slip op, p 7.