In People v. Lemons, 454 Mich 234, 253; 562 NW2d 447 (1997), the defendant, who was charged with first-degree CSC, argued that the trial court erred in denying her request for an instruction on the lesser included offense of second-degree CSC. Because a court must give a necessarily included lesser offense but need only give a cognate lesser included offense if supported by the evidence, id. at 254, the Supreme Court was required to decide whether second-degree CSC was a necessarily included or cognate lesser offense of first-degree CSC. The Supreme Court reasoned that, because sexual penetration need not be for any particular purpose whereas sexual contact requires that the touching must be such that it can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, second-degree CSC is a cognate lesser offense of first-degree CSC "because CSC II requires proof of an intent not required by CSC I--that defendant intended to seek sexual arousal or gratification . . . ." Id. at 253.