Jones v. Jackson National Life Ins Co

In Jones v. Jackson National Life Ins Co, 819 F Supp 1382, 1384 (WD Mich, 1993), a breach of insurance contract action, the United States district court construed Michigan's prejudgment interest statute in a broad manner: Jackson National argues that "written instrument" refers to debt instruments and other negotiable paper bearing an interest rate, not just any written contract. The life insurance policy here enforced is said not to be such a written instrument. Jackson National may be correct in arguing that not all written contracts are written instruments for purposes of MCL 600.6013(5). In all other respects, the argument is unpersuasive. Jackson National cites no clear authority for its proffered restrictive definition of "written instrument." In Miszewski v. Knauf Construction, Inc, 183 Mich App 312; 454 NW2d 253 (1990), the court applied subsection (6) of the prejudgment interest statute, rather than subsection (5), in awarding interest in connection with a judgment in a contract dispute. There is no indication in Miszewski, however, whether a written contract was enforced and whether it called for payment of a sum certain. Miszewski hardly represents a sufficient basis for departing from the general rule that statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Miller v. Irwin, 190 Mich App 610, 613; 476 NW2d 632 (1991). Where, as here, the judgment rendered has the effect of enforcing a written promise to pay a sum certain, judgment must be deemed to have been rendered on a written instrument. This conclusion is consistent with recognition that " MCL 600.6013 is a remedial statute which is to be liberally construed to give effect to its intent and purposes." Gordon Sel-way Inc v. Spence Brothers, Inc, 438 Mich 488; 475 NW2d 704 (1991), supra, 438 Mich at 510; 475 NW2d 704.