In LaBar v. Cooper, 376 Mich. 401, 406; 137 N.W.2d 136 (1965), the plaintiffs' physician sent Mrs. LaBar (hereafter the plaintiff) to a hospital to get an intermuscular shot. She allegedly suffered radial nerve damage after receiving the shot in her upper arm. The plaintiffs (Mrs. LaBar and her husband) filed a medical malpractice action against several defendants, including the physician. In the original complaint, the plaintiffs alleged only that the shot had been negligently administered. However, during the course of ensuing discovery, the physician was deposed and testified the shot should have been given in the plaintiff's buttocks, not her arm. He further testified he had told the hospital's nursing staff on numerous occasions to administer such shots in a patient's buttocks rather than an arm. Approximately six months after the physician's deposition, the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to add a new theory charging the defendant doctor with general acts of negligence in sending Mrs. LaBar to the hospital when he knew the standard of care employed by the nurses was faulty and shots were administered by them in a dangerous place (the arm). The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend on the ground that the period of limitation had run. The Supreme Court of Michiganand remanded, reasoning, in pertinent part, that the amended complaint was based on the same transaction set forth in the original complaint. In interpreting GCR 1963, 118.4, identical in its operative terms to the current court rule, MCR 2.118(D), the Court looked to the origins and purpose of the then newly adopted court rule: GCR 1963, 118 is an adoption of Federal Rule 15. The purpose of its adoption is stated by Honigman and Hawkins, 1 Michigan Court Rules Annotated, page 416: "The relationship between the original pleading and a proposed amendment becomes important when the date of filing the amendment raises a question of limitations. The doctrine of 'relation back' was devised by the courts to associate the amended matter with the date of the original pleading, so that it would not be barred by the statute of limitations. But some restrictions had to be placed upon the doctrine, or claims clearly barred could be resurrected by pleading them in an amendment to an unrelated claim which was not barred. Previous Michigan cases had set this restriction in terms of whether the amended matter involved a new cause of action. "Sub-rule 118.4 is intended to introduce a more liberal and workable test, borrowed from the Federal rules. . . . The test is no longer conceptual, but rather functional. The amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading and, therefore, is not barred by limitations, whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amendment arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading. It is thus beside the point that the amendment introduces new facts, a new theory, or even a different cause of action, so long as it springs from the same transactional setting as that pleaded originally. The new test satisfies the basic policy of the statute of limitations, because the transactional base of the claim must still be pleaded before the statute runs, thereby giving defendant notice within the statutory period that he must be prepared to defend against all claims for relief arising out of that transaction." LaBar, 376 Mich. at 405-406. The LaBar Court, 376 Mich. at 408, expressly freed the relation-back rule from the strictures of past interpretation: The test . . . is no longer whether an amendment states a new cause of action, but is whether it arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence alleged in the original pleading sought to be amended. From the effective date of the new court rules, the old rule. . . was meant no longer to be followed.