Lanni v. Engler

In Lanni v. Engler, 994 F. Supp. 849, 852-855 (ED Mich, 1998), the federal district court examined Michigan's Sex Offenders Registration Act, concluding that the registration and notification provisions of the act are not punitive. The Lanni court explained: Although the Act does not contain an express statement of legislative intent, the implied purpose is plainly regulatory. Neither notification or registration inflicts suffering, disability, or restraint on the registered sex offender. It does nothing more than create a method for easier public access to compiled information that is otherwise available to the public through tedious research in criminal court files. Like similar laws in other states, the Michigan Act also seeks to provide the local citizenry with information concerning persons residing near them who have been convicted of sexually predatory conduct and who, by virtue of relatively high recidivism rates among such offenders and the devastating impact that sex crimes have on society, pose a serious threat to society. . . . The language of section 730 makes clear that the legislature intended the notification provision to prevent future attacks by recidivist sex offenders. The text and structure reveal no intent to punish, but rather only a regulatory purpose. Notification is limited both by the amount of information available and the area in which the information is disseminated. First, the data available for public dissemination is limited to information already available from law enforcement, court, and Department of Corrections records. Mich Comp Laws Ann 15.231 et seq. Second, access to the sex offender registry is limited by zip code so that only those living in the same zip code as the sex offender can obtain the information. A law designed to punish a sex offender would not contain these strict limitations on public dissemination. . . . Dissemination of information about a person's criminal involvement has always held the potential for negative repercussions for those involved. However, public notification in and of itself, has never been regarded as punishment when done in furtherance of a legitimate government interest. The registration and notification requirements can be more closely analogized to quarantine notices when public health is endangered by individuals with infectious diseases. Whenever notification is directed to a risk posed by individuals in the community, those individuals can expect to experience some embarrassment and isolation. Nonetheless, it is generally recognized that the state is well within its rights to issue such warnings and the negative effects are not regarded as punishment. . . . . . . This Court recognizes that imposition of the registration and notification requirements may deter others from future criminal activity, a traditionally recognized punitive purpose. However, a secondary criminal purpose may not undermine the Act's primary remedial purpose, as deterrence "may serve civil as well as criminal goals." Lanni, 994 F. Supp. at 853-854. With regard to the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Lanni court further found that the statute was designed to protect the public, not punish defendants, and that any effects from notification were reasonable in light of this goal. Lanni, 994 F. Supp. at 854-855. Accordingly, the Lanni court concluded that it was not an ex post facto law. Id. at 855.