McKiney v. Clayman

In McKiney v. Clayman, 237 Mich App 198, 200-201; 602 NW2d 612 (1999), the plaintiff was treated by the defendant dentist from June, 1989, to December 3, 1993, for recurring sores or lesions on her tongue. Notwithstanding that the initial procedure removed a cancerous growth, the defendant assured the plaintiff that she did not have cancer. On December 2, 1993, the plaintiff received a tentative cancer diagnosis from other doctors. However, at the plaintiff's last visit to the defendant on December 3, 1993, he remained of the opinion that the plaintiff did not have cancer. A March, 1994, biopsy confirmed the cancer. The plaintiff's malpractice action, filed on December 21, 1995, was dismissed based on the running of the statute of limitations. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that, because she received treatment by telephone through March 3, 1994, her action accrued on that date. The Court found that the plaintiff's position ignored the statutory language defining accrual as the time of the act or omission which is the basis for the claim, and ignored the Legislature's clear rejection of the notion that the existence of a continuing physician-client relationship by itself could extend the accrual date beyond the specific act or omission which formed the basis of the claim. McKiney, supra, at 203. The Court carefully reviewed the plaintiff's testimony regarding those discussions with the defendant, but concluded that the testimony "did not allege any new, distinct negligent acts or omissions by the defendant in the early months of 1994," id, at 207, that the plaintiff's malpractice claim accrued on December 3, 1993, and that her December 21, 1995, claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Id., at 209.