In People v. Lemons, 454 Mich 234, 245-247; 562 NW2d 447 (1997), the Court stated: Duress is a common-law affirmative defense. It is applicable in situations where the crime committed avoids a greater harm. The reasons underlying its existence are easy to discern: "The rationale of the defense of duress is that, for reasons of social policy, it is better that the defendant, faced with a choice of evils, choose to do the lesser evil (violate the criminal law) in order to avoid the geater evil threatened by the other person." In order to properly raise the defense, the defendant has the burden of producing "some evidence from which the jury can conclude that the essential elements of duress are present." In People v. Luther, 394 Mich 619, 623; 232 NW2d 184 (1975), we held that a defendant successfully carries the burden of production where the defendant introduces some evidence from which the jury could conclude the following: "A) The threatening conduct was sufficient to create in the mind of a reasonable person the fear of death or serious bodily harm; B) The conduct in fact caused such fear of death or serious bodily harm in the mind of the defendant; C) The fear or duress was operating upon the mind of the defendant at the time of the alleged act; and D) The defendant committed the act to avoid the threatened harm." Additionally, in People v. Merhige, 212 Mich 601, 610-611; 180 NW 418 (1920), we acknowledged that the threatening conduct or act of compulsion must be "present, imminent, and impending, that a threat of further injury is not enough," and that the threat "must have arisen without the negligence or fault of the person who insists upon it as a defense. In Lemons, supra at 249-250, the Court found that the defendant had not offered sufficient evidence to support an instruction on duress. Specifically, the Court indicated that the defendant's testimony "offered nothing with regard to the immediacy of any specific threat as it related to any specific criminal act . . . ." Id.