In Pompey v. General Motors Corp, 385 Mich. 537, 552; 189 N.W.2d 243 (1971), the plaintiff claimed racial discrimination under the Fair Employment Practices Act and the Michigan Constitution. Pompey, 385 Mich. at 542. One of the arguments raised by the defendant was that the plaintiff's claim was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Michigan Civil Rights Commission. Pompey, 385 Mich. at 543. The Court rejected the argument that the Civil Rights Commission had exclusive jurisdiction in the matter and concluded that the plaintiff could avail himself of the cumulative judicial remedy of a civil action for damages. Pompey, 385 Mich. at 551. In its reasoning, the Court recognized that at common law there was no remedy for racial discrimination and that ordinarily this meant that the remedy set forth in any statute creating a new right was the exclusive remedy available for violation of that right. Pompey, 385 Mich. at 552. However, the Court found that there was a history of applying an exception to this rule where civil rights legislation was involved: For reasons presently given, we reject defendant's arguments that the Civil Rights Commission's jurisdiction in this area is exclusive, and conclude that plaintiff may avail himself of a cumulative judicial remedy in vindication of this specific civil right. Our reasons for so holding are immersed in the origins of plaintiff's asserted civil right. In 1955, the fair employment practices act created a civil right in the opportunity to obtain employment without discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry. Defendant contends, and we agree, that prior to the passing of this important legislation in 1955, there was in Michigan no recognized legal remedy for acts of discrimination based on race in private employment. While a right of action was recognized for racial discrimination in public accommodation and in the enjoyment of various other civil rights, the right to be free from discrimination on account of race in private employment was not regarded as a civil right entitled to protection of the law. We recognize that the fact that there was no pre-existent common-law remedy for racial discrimination in private employment is generally highly significant in determining the exclusiveness of the statutory remedy. The general rule, in which Michigan is aligned with a strong majority of jurisdictions, is that where a new right is created or a new duty is imposed by statute, the remedy provided for enforcement of that right by the statute for its violation and nonperformance is exclusive. Correlatively, a statutory remedy for enforcement of a common-law right is deemed only cumulative. But courts have forged exceptions to these general rules when the statutory rights infringed were civil rights. Although there is some authority to the contrary most decisions have held that a person aggrieved by the violation of a civil rights statute is entitled to pursue a remedy which will effectively reimburse him for or relieve him from violation of the statute, notwithstanding the statute did not expressly give him such right or remedy. Pompey, 385 Mich. at 551-553. The Court went on to discuss earlier cases in Michigan that supported finding that a civil action for damages could be brought where a party's civil rights are at issue. The Court concluded that its decisions in Ferguson, Bolden, and St John supported a holding that such a civil remedy existed, although those cases involved statutes that provided for only criminal remedy. Pompey, 385 Mich. at 553-557. In a footnote, the Court stated that an aggrieved person was entitled to a cumulative civil remedy for damages regardless of the form the civil rights statute took, whether it provided only for a criminal remedy, no remedy, or any other remedy. Pompey, 385 Mich. at 556-557, n 18. The Court in Pompey then reviewed the remedies available to the plaintiff and found that, while the Civil Rights Commission had jurisdiction and could provide a remedy, there was no intent apparent from the legislation or from comments made at the constitutional convention that the remedy before the Civil Rights Commission was meant to be the exclusive remedy. Pompey, 385 Mich. at 557-559. In fact, there was a clear statement contained in Const 1963, art 5, 29, that the creation of the Civil Rights Commission did not intend to displace any judicial remedies an individual may have. Pompey, 385 Mich. at 558. The Court then held as follows: "We hold that plaintiff can maintain a civil damage action for redress of his statutorily created right to be free from discrimination in private employment, and that this remedy may be pursued in addition to the remedial machinery provided by statute." Id Pompey, 385 Mich. at 560.