"In New Jersey, the guiding principle governing the scope of an arbitration clause is 'that only those issues may be arbitrated which the parties have agreed shall be.'" United Serv. Auto. Ass'n (USAA) v. Turck, 156 N.J. 480, 485, 721 A.2d 1 (1998). See also Quigley, supra, 330 N.J.Super. at 270-71, 749 A.2d 405 (affirming the prevailing view that only those issues that the parties agreed to arbitrate are arbitrable). When arbitration provisions are broadly worded, courts have "construed [the provision] as encompassing tort, as well as contract claims." Bleumer, supra, 277 N.J.Super. at 405, 649 A.2d 913; See also: Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 398, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 1803, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967) (stating that there is no indication that fraud in the inducement of a contract is not subject to arbitration under the contract); Altshul Stern & Co., Inc. v. Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Ltd., 385 F.2d 158, 159 (2d Cir.1967), (holding that "[p]laintiff cannot avoid the broad language of the arbitration clause [providing that "any dispute or difference arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach thereof" shall be subject to arbitration] by casting its complaint in tort" because the tort action was not "wholly independent of the contract").