In Blazovic v. Andrich, 124 N.J. 90, 590 A.2d 222 (1991), the Supreme Court held that the Comparative Negligence Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 to -5.8, requires fault to be apportioned between a contributorily negligent plaintiff, a negligent co-defendant bar/restaurant and several co-defendants whose alleged fault was based on intentional conduct. Id. at 92-93, 590 A.2d 222. In Blazovic, the Court held that the Comparative Negligence Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 to -5.8, requires apportionment of fault among a negligent plaintiff patron, a negligent co-defendant restaurant/bar and several settling co-defendants whose fault was based on intentional conduct. Blazovic, supra, 124 N.J. at 92-93, 590 A.2d 222. Blazovic specifically held "that the Comparative Negligence Act applies to conduct characterized as intentional," id. at 112, 590 A.2d 222, and was intended to cover fault in a broad sense, id. at 98, 590 A.2d 222 (citing Suter v. San Angelo Foundry and Machine Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979)). Blazovic thus clarified that "responsibility for a plaintiff's claimed injury is to be apportioned according to each party's relative degree of fault, including the fault attributable to an intentional tortfeasor." Id. at 107, 590 A.2d 222. In reviewing the Appellate Division's decision in Blazovic, the Supreme Court noted Judge Landau's dissent, which argued, in accordance with the Restatement, "that plaintiffs would be disadvantaged if fault were substantially allocated to intentional wrongdoers who were not financially able to satisfy the judgment." Id. at 110, 590 A.2d 222. The Court rejected this analysis "because it ignores the principle that the parties causing any injury should be liable in proportion to their relative fault." Ibid. In addition, the Court recognized that it was adopting a position that has not been widely accepted. Blazovic specifically noted that "most courts that have considered the issue have declined to extend comparative-fault principles to conduct characterized as intentional." Id. at 100, 590 A.2d 222. The Court specifically noted that it was "unpersuaded by the decisions of other jurisdictions that reject apportionment of fault in actions involving intentional tortfeasors." Id. at 106, 590 A.2d 222. Thus, despite, our dissenting colleague's concern expressed in Blazovic and the many courts that have rejected the principle, the Supreme Court mandated apportionment of fault between negligent and intentional tortfeasors.