Cooper v. Cooper

In Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 491 A.2d 606 (1984), the Court established that a court must weigh the following interests in any removal case: the moving parent's freedom of mobility, the interests of the objecting parent, and the best interests of the child. Cooper, supra, 99 N.J. at 55-56, 491 A.2d 606. The Court concluded that the purpose of N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 is "to preserve the rights of the noncustodial parent and the child to maintain and develop their familial relationship." Id., at 50, 491 A.2d 606. The Court in Cooper "incorporated a consideration of the well-being of the custodial parent into its consideration of the best interests of the child," Voit v. Voit, 317 N.J.Super. 103, 116, 721 A.2d 317 (Ch.Div.1998), stating: The realities of the situation after divorce compel the realization that the child's quality of life and style of life are provided by the custodial parent. That the interests of the child are closely interwoven with those of the custodial parent is consistent with psychological studies of children of divorced or separated parents. . . . Because the best interests of a child are so interwoven with the well-being of the custodial parent, the determination of the child's best interest requires that the interests of the custodial parent be taken into account. Cooper, supra, 99 N.J. at 53-54, 491 A.2d 606. In Cooper, the initial burden was placed on the custodial parent to show "a real advantage" to the proposed move. Cooper, 99 N.J. at 56, 491 A.2d 606. However, that burden was not a heavy one because the advantage "need not be a substantial advantage but one based on a sincere and genuine desire of the custodial parent to move and a sensible good faith reason for the move." Ibid. Once that threshold showing was made by the custodial parent, the trial court had to consider three factors: (1) the prospective advantages of the move; (2) the integrity of the motives of the parents; (3) "whether, under the facts of the individual case, a realistic and reasonable visitation schedule can be reached if the move was allowed." Cooper, supra, 99 N.J. at 56- 57, 491 A.2d 606. In determining whether a parenting time schedule was reasonable, the burden was placed on the noncustodial parent. Cooper, 99 N.J. at 57-58, 491 A.2d 606. The Court stated: Since the noncustodial parent has the necessary information to demonstrate that an alternative visitation schedule is not feasible because of distance, time, or financial restraints, we place the burden on that parent to come forward with evidence that a proposed alternative visitation schedule would be impossible or so burdensome as to affect unreasonably and adversely his or her right to preserve his or her relationship with the child. We emphasize that more than a showing of inconvenience by the noncustodial parent is required to overcome a custodial parent's right to remove the children after he or she has met the threshold showing that the move would be a real advantage to him or her and would not be inimical to the best interests of the children. Ibid. The Court continued: "If, however, the noncustodial parent does present evidence that his or her relationship and visitation with the children would be adversely affected by the move, then the trial court must balance the competing interests of the parties." Id., at 58, 491 A.2d 606.