In Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 708 A.2d 401 (1998), , the debate was not about the possible difference between "occur" and "accrue," but rather, about whether a cause of action that had occurred and accrued prior to the effective date of the Affidavit of Merit statute, was subject to the act when the complaint, actually a counterclaim, was timely filed, albeit after the effective date of the Affidavit of Merit statute. When an affidavit of merit was not filed within sixty days of plaintiff's answer to the counterclaim, and the counterclaimant's motion for an extension of the filing period was denied, the issue was joined. The Affidavit of Merit statute states: "This act shall take effect immediately June 29, 1995 and shall apply to causes of action which occur on or after the effective date of this act." L. 1995, c. 139, 5. The basis of the dispute in Cornblatt was the phrase "causes of action which occur." The defendant/counter-claimant said the phrase was synonymous with "causes of action which accrue," while the plaintiff equated the phrase to "causes of action filed." Cornblatt, supra, 153 N.J. at 232, 708 A.2d 401. In this context, when the time of occurrence and accrual were congruent, the Court said: In sum, the meaning of the Affidavit of Merit Bill calls for its application only to those cases the underlying legally-significant facts of which happen, arise, or take place on or after the effective date of the statute.Id. at 236, 708 A.2d 401.