This doctrine as it may apply to employers in their capacities as property owners or manufacturers of plant equipment has been described as "fundamentally unsound" and rejected in a majority of jurisdictions because of its circumvention of the clear legislative mandate of workers' compensation law. Billy v. Consolidated Machine Tool Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 152, 432 N.Y.S.2d 879, 883, 412 N.E.2d 934, 939 (1980). In New Jersey it is disfavored, if not outright disapproved. DeFigueiredo v. U.S. Metals Refining Co., supra; Doe v. St. Michael's Medical Center, Newark, 184 N.J. Super. 1, 8, 445 A.2d 40 (App.Div.1982); Taylor v. Pfaudler Sybron Corp., 150 N.J. Super. 48, 51, 374 A.2d 1222 (App.Div.1977), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 20, 379 A.2d 251 (1977); Holliday v. Personal Products Co., 939 F. Supp. 402 (E.D.Pa.1996), aff'd, 114 F.3d 1172 (3d Cir.1997). Furthermore, no case in this State has ever invoked the "dual capacity" doctrine to impose common law liability on an employer who modifies or alters a machine used exclusively in its plant. As this court held in DeFigueiredo v. U.S. Metals Refining Co., supra, "while the dual capacity doctrine may have viability in some circumstances, it is clearly inapplicable here, where the employee is injured during the course of his employment on the premises of the employer." Id. at 408.