In Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161, 177-78, 501 A.2d 505 (1985), the New Jersey Supreme Court defined intentional wrong as a deliberate intent to injure, provable either by evidence of an actual subjective intent to injure or by proof of circumstances making it substantially certain to the actor that deleterious consequences will result from his action. Millison, supra, 101 N.J. at 178, 501 A.2d 505; see also N.J. Mfrs. Ins. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 287 N.J. Super. 190, 194-197, 670 A.2d 1071 (App.Div.1995). Millison did not change the intentional wrong standard, it merely clarified the manners in which it could be proven. The Supreme Court stated that "in order to satisfy the Compensation Act's definition of 'intentional wrong', claimants have heretofore been required to show a deliberate intent to injure." Id. at 170, 501 A.2d 505. The Court in Millison sought to delineate a standard by which it may be determined what exactly amounted to an 'intentional wrong' to overcome the exclusivity provision. The Court adopted a 'substantial certainty' test which requires, in an intentional wrong case, a virtual certainty that the consequences would occur. Id. at 178, 501 A.2d 505. The Supreme Court pointed to two factors that further define the meaning of "deliberate intention to injure;" namely, conduct and context. Millison, supra, 101 N.J. at 178-79, 501 A.2d 505. For "conduct," the Court adopted a "substantial certainty" test. Id. at 178, 501 A.2d 505.