In Potter v. Village Bank, 225 N.J. Super. 547, 560-61, 543 A.2d 80 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 113 N.J. 352, 550 A.2d 462 (1988), the Court determined a "whistle blower" has a cause of action based upon "retaliatory discharge from employment in violation of a clear mandate of public policy." Speaking through Judge (now Justice) Coleman, the Court said: It is now apparent that Pierce does not require an at will employee's claim of retaliatory discharge to be based on a specific statute which proscribes a particular type of discharge. Rather, an employer's obligation to refrain from discharging an employee who reports suspected criminal activities to law enforcement officials reflects a duty imposed upon all employers . . . in order to implement the fundamental public policies embodied in the State and federal penal statutes. Additionally, after plaintiff's employment was terminated, the Legislature enacted the Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 et seq. See L. 1986, c. 105, 1, effective September 5, 1986. Under the act, an employee who has been terminated because of reporting suspected criminal violations, has the right to file a retaliatory tort claim in addition to other remedies. N.J.S.A. 34:19-3. We read this legislative enactment as a codification of public policy established through judicial decisions. Id. at 558, 560, 543 A.2d 80. As Potter indicates, CEPA was not a derivative of Title VII or other federal discriminatory statutes, but rather a codification of the public policy provided in Pierce and subsequent cases which had established common law claims. Ibid.