In Procanik by Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 347, 478 A.2d 755 (1984), the Court defined a wrongful birth claim as "the cause of action of parents who claim that the negligent advice or treatment deprived them of the choice of avoiding conception or . . . terminating the pregnancy." 97 N.J. at 348, 478 A.2d 755. Yet, despite that narrow definition of the cause of action, plaintiffs seize on the following brief passage from Procanik to argue for the expansion of the cause of action: When a child requires extraordinary medical care, the financial impact is felt not just by the parents, but also by the injured child. As a practical matter, the impact may extend beyond the injured child to his brothers or sisters. Money that is spent for the health care of one child is not available for the clothes, food or college education of another child. Id. at 351, 478 A.2d 755. That passage, however, was not written to suggest that, on another day in another case, the Court might entertain an action by siblings for damages in their own right. Rather, it preceded and was the essential underpinning of the Court's rationale for allowing the recovery of extraordinary medical expenses. The sentence immediately succeeding the quoted passage relied upon by plaintiffs clarifies its meaning: "Recovery of the cost of extraordinary medical expenses by either the parents or the infant, but not both, is consistent with the principle that the doctor's negligence vitally affects the entire family." Ibid. In the discussion that followed, the Court rejected the infant plaintiff's claim for damages beyond extraordinary medical expenses, for reasons discussed earlier in this opinion. Id. at 353-355, 478 A.2d 755. It seems unlikely to us that the same Court that denied diminished childhood damages to a disabled child, based on the argument that "parents are less able to love and care for the child in such circumstances," would permit siblings to recover damages for diminished childhood relying on the same rationale. Id. at 354, 478 A.2d 755.