RPC 1.6 provides: (a) a lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraphs (b) and (c). (b) a lawyer shall reveal such information to the proper authorities, as soon as, and to the extent the lawyer believes necessary, to prevent the client: (1) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result in . . . substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another; (2) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably believes is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon a tribunal. (c) a lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal, illegal or fraudulent act in the furtherance of which the lawyer's services had been used; (3) to comply with other law. (d) Reasonable belief for purposes of RPC 1.6 is the belief or conclusion of a reasonable lawyer that is based upon information that has some foundation in fact and constitutes prima facie evidence of the matters referred to in subsections (b) or (c). In Fellerman v. Bradley, 99 N.J. 493, 493 A.2d 1239 (1985) the Court observed that as misleading, inconsistent, or deceitful attorney-client communications or conduct directed toward the court were not privileged, the attorney's post-judgment disclosure of the client's whereabouts to prevent his "flouting" of the court's judgment and order of enforcement could not constitute a violation of the attorney's duties of confidentiality under the precursor to RPC 1.6 because the communication could not be considered a confidence under those circumstances. Id. at 507-09, 493 A.2d 1239