In State v. Jiminez, 257 N.J. Super. 567, 608 A.2d 996 (App.Div.1992), the Court upheld a charge on aggravated manslaughter that parallels the charge given here. That charge defined "recklessness" in terms of the standard definition contained in N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3) and explained that "extreme indifference to human life," meant probability of death rather than possibility, 257 N.J. Super. at 577-78, 577 n.1, 608 A.2d 996 The Court concluded, however, that the instructions on reckless manslaughter and death by auto were not sufficient because they did not differentiate between the type of recklessness the State must prove for reckless manslaughter and the type of recklessness it must prove for death by auto. Jiminez, 257 N.J. Super. at 581, 608 A.2d 996. The Court said it was obvious that the distinction between the recklessness required for aggravated manslaughter and that necessary for reckless manslaughter is clear because of the addition in the aggravated manslaughter section of the language "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life" . . . . The more difficult question is whether the jury was appropriately apprised of the quantitatively greater recklessness contemplated for manslaughter than that required for death by auto . . . . Id. at 581-82, 608 A.2d 996.