State v. Rechtschaffer

In State v. Rechtschaffer, 70 N.J. 395, 360 A.2d 362 (1976), the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed the question of whether double jeopardy applied when the trial judge sua sponte declared a mistrial based upon "highly prejudicial statements" made by the prosecutor during examination of a witness. The trial judge found that the prosecutor acted in good faith but defendant had nevertheless been unduly prejudiced by the remarks. The Supreme Court, in reviewing the jurisprudence of double jeopardy, stated: "Manifest necessity" and "the ends of public justice" are concepts whose definitive outlines depend upon the singular facts and circumstances of each case. Existence of these two criteria depends upon balancing two prime factors: Public interest in seeing that there is a fair trial designed to end in a just and equitable judgment; and the constitutional protection to which the defendant is entitled that he shall not be harassed by subjection to two trials and two punishments for essentially the same offense. Id. at 405, 360 A.2d 362. The Supreme Court posed a series of questions to be asked by appellate courts in reviewing a sua sponte declaration of a mistrial. Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion so that a mistrial was justified? Did it have a viable alternative? If justified, what circumstances created the situation? Was it due to prosecutorial or defense misconduct? Will a second trial accord with the ends of public justice and with proper judicial administration? Will the defendant be prejudiced by a second trial, and if so to what extent? Id. at 410-11, 360 A.2d 362. There, the Supreme Court found "that neither the prosecutor nor the defense counsel concurred in the trial court's action;" "no prosecutorial manipulation or misbehavior was charged;" defendant was prejudiced and "the dual trial conflicted with proper judicial administration." Id. at 411, 360 A.2d 362. The Court concluded, therefore, "that neither manifest necessity nor the ends of public justice warranted the grant of the partial mistrial." Ibid.