In State v. Riley, 306 N.J. Super. 141, 146, 703 A.2d 347 (App.Div.1997), the Court faced the issue of whether defendant was armed with a deadly weapon "simply by reason of the pocket knife having been on his person during the course of the robbery." Stated slightly differently, the issue was whether the proofs permitted the finding that defendant's pocket knife was, in the circumstances of the robbery, permissibly categorized as a deadly weapon. Id. at 148, 703 A.2d 347. In Riley defendant was charged and convicted of first-degree robbery. He appealed, arguing that because the victim never had knowledge of the knife, the robbery could not be elevated from second-degree robbery to first-degree. The Court agreed, holding that a robbery may only be elevated to first-degree where defendant is "armed with, or uses or threatens the immediate use of a deadly weapon." Id. at 146, 703 A.2d 347; N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(b). In determining what constituted a "deadly weapon" the Court recognized there are two discrete categories. The first is firearms, which are per se deadly weapons "whose character as deadly weapons is not . . . dependent on how they are used or intended to be used or on what the victim believes their deadly capacity is." Riley, 306 N.J. Super. at 146, 703 A.2d 347. The second category is the "all-inclusive category of every other material object that can be used or intended to be used in such a way as to cause death or serious bodily injury or is so fashioned to lead the victim to believe it has that capacity." Ibid. This second category consists of two discrete classes of objects: the first includes per se weapons that are not firearms weapons that are "presumed by law to be possessed with the intention of causing death or serious bodily injury unless possessed . . . by persons who have legitimate safety reasons for their possession." Id. at 146-47, 703 A.2d 347. The second class includes all those objects having a wide variety of lawful uses but which may take on the character of a deadly weapon because they are both capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury and have in fact been so used or are intended to be so used or are so fashioned to lead the victim of a crime to believe they can be so used. Id. at 147, 703 A.2d 347.