In State v. Robinson, 289 N.J. Super. 447, 289 N.J. Super. 467, 673 A.2d 1372 (App.Div.1996), a burglary case, the Court held that under the circumstances there presented it was not necessary for the court to instruct the jury on a specific offense the defendant intended to commit. The trial judge agreed. In Robinson, at approximately 11:30 p.m. a neighbor observed two men go behind an occupied residence, one of them holding an unidentified object. The neighbor called the police, and upon their arrival they detained one of the men, who was standing in front of the house. The second man, later identified as the defendant, was hanging half in and half out of a window in the rear of the house. When the police announced themselves, the defendant jumped from the window and fled, throwing an object to the ground. The police caught the defendant and recovered the object, a screwdriver. The window had pry marks. The two men did not know the occupants of the residence. Id. at 450-51, 673 A.2d 1372. The defense was misidentification, the defendant claiming he was not the person who was seen climbing in the window. Id. at 451, 673 A.2d 1372. Therefore, no innocent purpose for the conduct of the perpetrator was suggested by the evidence. Id. at 455, 673 A.2d 1372. The trial court explained to the jury the element of "purpose to commit an offense: " "What offense and whether there was an offense is a question for you to determine based on the facts as you have heard them in the testimony in this case." Id. at 452, 673 A.2d 1372. The Court concluded that there was "no reasonable basis upon which the jury might have convicted defendant for entering the dwelling with the purpose to engage in lawful activity," and found that "no reasonable jury under these circumstances needed further guidance beyond the judge's definition of an offense as 'unlawful conduct.'" Id. at 455, 673 A.2d 1372. The Court also noted that the term "offense" includes a crime, disorderly or petty disorderly persons offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14k. Ibid. The Court concluded that, under the particular circumstances of that case, "no reasonable jury would have difficulty concluding 'without guidance' whether defendant's purpose was to commit 'some unlawful act,' the specific wrongful act being of no consequence where no innocent purpose is suggested by the evidence." Id. at 456, 673 A.2d 1372.