In State v. Stanton, 339 N.J. Super. 1, 770 A.2d 1198 (App.Div.2001), the Court concluded that the rationale of Johnson is not limited to NERA, and that under any statute that mandates a period of parole ineligibility based on the existence of a fact other than the record of a prior conviction, the factual predicate for the sentence must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt: In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that if a statutorily prescribed sentence or sentencing range for a specific crime is also, by statute, required to be enhanced by the finding of a corollary fact that is not a necessary element of that crime, that fact must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. That ruling was applied by State v. Johnson, supra, 166 N.J. 523, 544-45, 766 A.2d 1126, to NERA, the New Jersey Supreme Court holding that as a matter of constitutional imperative, "the factual predicate for a NERA sentence must be found by a jury under the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard." We understand that a so-called NERA sentence, which requires the defendant to serve eighty-five percent of the base term imposed if he is found to have committed a violent crime as defined by NERA, is not an enhanced sentence in the sense that it exceeds the statutory maximum for the crime itself. But, as Johnson explains, a NERA sentence nevertheless does constitute additional punishment because of its imposition of increased real time. State v. Johnson, supra, 166 N.J. at 541-42, 766 A.2d 1126. In any event, we are, of course, bound by Johnson's reading of Apprendi, and as we understand Johnson, even though it was directly addressing only NERA, its underlying holding is not subject to doubt. In sum, as we view Johnson, it holds that if imposition of a statutorily mandated parole ineligibility term is based on the existence of a fact other than a record of a prior conviction, then, as a matter of the imperatives of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, that fact must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 339 N.J. Super. at 6-7, 770 A.2d 1198. Accordingly, even though the statutory provision governing vehicular homicide provides that the court shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the defendant was "intoxicated," which finding mandates a three-year period of parole ineligibility, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5b(2), we concluded in Stanton that, to preserve the constitutionality of that statute, it must be interpreted to require the finding of intoxication to be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 339 N.J. Super. at 8, 770 A.2d 1198.