In Aaron v. Roemer, Wallens & Mineaux (272 AD2d 752 [3d Dept 2000], lv dismissed 96 NY2d 730 [2001]), a law firm undertook to represent the plaintiff in defense of a federal suit. in July 1995, the firm served an answer and an amended answer, which omitted a statute of limitations defense. Thereafter, the attorney-client relationship deteriorated due to fee issues and other disagreements. On October 24, 1995, the law firm faxed a letter to the plaintiff stating that by noon of the following day it would mail a letter to District Court seeking permission to withdraw as his attorneys. When the firm made a motion to withdraw, the client advised the court in writing on November 8, 1995 that he would not contest the withdrawal, stating that "this now fractured relationship" could not be mended (272 AD2d at 753). The plaintiff also stated that he was seeking new counsel. On November 10, 1995, the plaintiff sent a letter to the law firm asking for a meeting to "finalize" his relationship with the firm (id.). Notwithstanding the pending motion to withdraw, on November 15, 1995, the firm signed a stipulation with opposing counsel in the federal suit extending the time to respond with discovery. Finally, on November 17, 1995, the court signed an order finding grounds warranting withdrawal and permitting the law firm to withdraw. At some point, the plaintiff retained new counsel. Following trial in April 1998, damages were assessed against the plaintiff in the federal action. Three years after the law firm withdrew, on November 17, 1998, the client commenced the malpractice action against the law firm, alleging that it was negligent in failing to plead the affirmative defense in the federal action. The law firm moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint based on the three-year statute of limitations defense. The Supreme Court denied the law firm's motion on the ground that the attorney-client relationship between the law firm and the plaintiff did not terminate until November 17, 1995, when the court issued the order permitting the law firm to withdraw as counsel, and that, therefore, the action was timely commenced. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, based on the particular facts presented. The Appellate Division noted that the alleged legal malpractice occurred in July and September 1995, more than three years before commencement of the action, and thus, the action was time-barred unless the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous representation rule. Plaintiff's letter evidenced that no later than November 8, 1995, he perceived that the relationship with his attorneys had been irretrievably broken. His lack of confidence in the law firm was also demonstrated by his complaint to District Court concerning the inclusion of "sensitive documents" in the law firm's motion to withdraw (272 AD2d at 755). The Appellate Division found that "the mere facts that plaintiff was not yet represented by another attorney, that defendant [subsequently] signed a stipulation identifying himself as plaintiff's attorney on November 15, 1995 and that defendant was not formally permitted to withdraw until November 17, 1995, fail to establish that plaintiff's trust and confidence in defendants continued or was restored after November 8, 1995, particularly since plaintiff was then unaware of the latter two facts." (Id.) Under such "special circumstances, where the attorney promptly moves to withdraw and the client acknowledges in writing an irreparable deterioration of the attorney-client relationship, we conclude that the relationship necessary to invoke the continuous treatment rule did not persist until formal termination of the nominal representation by defendants, but rather ceased with the disruption of the client's trust and reliance prior to November 8, 1995." (Id.)