In Abitol v. Schiff (180 Misc 2d 949, 691 NYS2d 753 [1999]), the court thoughtfully differentiated the standard that applies to defendants' motion for an extension of time for service of the motion to dismiss and the one that applies to plaintiff's cross motion for an extension of time to serve the complaint. "The time requirement is not unyielding, and the court has explicit authority to extend the time for the motion. An extension is not to be had for the asking, however. The standard set by the Legislature for an extension of time is not merely 'for good cause shown,' or 'in the interest of justice,' but is instead the more stringent one of 'undue hardship' (compare, e.g., CPLR 306-b, 2004 and 3212 [a]). The attention of the court is thus narrowly focused on the existence of obstacles to a timely motion, and not on the over-all circumstances of the action. In the court's opinion, a showing of 'undue hardship' in this context requires proof that the motion could not have been made within the time limited by CPLR 3211 (e) by the exercise of ordinary diligence. That the defendant delayed by only a few days should not be sufficient, and the issue of prejudice to the plaintiff should ordinarily not be relevant. The merits of the motion should also be irrelevant, since the defects in service, however egregious they may have been, did not prevent the defendant from answering the complaint. Further, any delay due to law office failure, while relevant to considerations of 'good cause' (Tewari v. Tsoutsouras, 75 NY2d 1, 550 NYS2d 572, 549 NE2d 1143), should ordinarily be irrelevant here." (Id. at 950-951, 691 NYS2d 753.)