In Bluebird Partners v. First Fid. Bank (94 NY2d 726 [2000]), the Court of Appeals set forth an instructive history on the champerty concept and explained that: "in order to constitute champertous conduct in the acquisition of rights that would then be nullified and to resolve the question at issue, the foundational intent to sue on that claim must at least have been the primary purpose for, if not the sole motivation behind, entering into the transaction. The words, 'sole' and 'primary,' are not synonymous generally or in law. A purpose that is the sole purpose is, by necessity, the primary purpose. However, a purpose that is primary is not necessarily the sole purpose. Yet, the distinction is one without a legal difference when the 'primary' element is present. The bottom line is that Judiciary Law 489 requires that the acquisition be made with the intent and for the purpose (as contrasted to a purpose) of bringing an action or proceeding." (Id. at 736, 709.)