In Brill v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.3d 648 (2004), the City of New York filed a motion for summary judgment close to one year after the note of issue and certificate of readiness were filed. The City argued that it did not have prior written notice of the alleged defect of the accident site and plaintiff could not show an exception to the prior written notice requirement. The trial court determined that in the interests of judicial economy, and in finding that plaintiff was not prejudiced by the delay, entertained the motion and granted summary judgment to the City. The Appellate Division thereafter affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Supreme Court should not have considered the merits of the City's motion for summary judgment because the City offered no explanation for the delay in making the motion thus failing to demonstrate "good cause" as required under the statute. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Supreme Court should not have considered the merits of a summary judgment motion brought by the City of New York almost one year after the filing of the note of issue, as the City gave no explanation for filing the motion after the 120-day limit specified in CPLR 3212 (a). The Court of Appeals stated, "We conclude that 'good cause' in CPLR 3212 (a) requires a showing of good cause for the delay in making the motion--a satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness--rather than simply permitting meritorious, nonprejudicial filings, however tardy . . . No excuse at all, or a perfunctory excuse, cannot be 'good cause'" (Brill v. City of New York, 2 NY3d at 652; see also Miceli v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725, 726, 819 NE2d 995, 786 NYS2d 379 [2004]; Perini Corp. v. City of New York (Department of Envtl. Protection), 16 AD3d 37, 789 NYS2d 29 [1st Dept 2005]). In Brill, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Supreme Court should not have considered the merits of a summary judgment motion brought by the City of New York almost one year after the filing of the note of issue, as the City gave no explanation for filing the motion after the 120-day limit specified in CPLR 3212 (a). The Court of Appeals stated, "We conclude that 'good cause' in CPLR 3212 (a) requires a showing of good cause for the delay in making the motion - a satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness - rather than simply permitting meritorious, nonprejudicial filings, however tardy ... No excuse at all, or a perfunctory excuse, cannot be 'good cause'" (Brill v. City of New York, 2 NY3d at 652.)