In Caboara v. Babylon Cove Dev., LLC, 54 AD3d 79 [2d Dept 2008] Justice David Ritter, writing for the Second Department, explained: "The prohibition against "artful pleading" is completely consistent with this precedent. The purpose of the prohibition is "to prevent an end run" around the exclusive nature of the Martin Act rule by precluding a private plaintiff from bringing a cause of action, for example, that, "although styled as one for common-law fraud, lacks proof of an essential element of common-law fraud'"... Here, taking the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the complaint was sufficient to state causes of action to recover damages for common-law fraud and breach of contract ... Thus, the allegations are not mere artful pleading. Finally, we note that the above determinations are in accord with basic tenets of statutory construction. The Legislature is presumed to be aware of the law in existence at the time of an enactment and to have abrogated the common law only to the extent that the clear import of the language of the statute requires ... Further, "the general rule is and long has been that " when the common law gives a remedy, and another remedy is provided by statute, the latter is cumulative, unless made exclusive by the statute'" ... Here, nothing in the clear import of the language of the Martin Act requires a conclusion that the Legislature intended to abrogate any common-law remedy arising from conduct prohibited under the act. Nor are the remedies afforded the Attorney General made exclusive by the Martin Act. Thus, the plaintiffs' common-law fraud and breach of contract causes of action were neither abrogated nor supplanted by the Martin Act ... Consequently, the Supreme Court erred in dismissing same." (Caboara, 54 AD3d at 82-83.)