In Citron v. Citron (91 Misc 2d 785 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 1977]) the trial court found that the legislature's enactment of section 248 was designed to give judges discretion to modify maintenance if the former spouse lived with a member of the opposite sex while "she was being accepted by society as another man's wife." (Citron v. Citron, 91 Misc 2d at 785.) After the lengthy analysis of the statutory history, the court recognized that reputation--how the couple was perceived by others--was the critical ingredient in applying the "holding out" principle in Domestic Relations Law 248. There is an argument, reviewed in Citron v. Citron, but ultimately rejected both by the trial court in that case and later by the Court of Appeals, that Domestic Relations Law 248 was designed to enable a court to modify maintenance on the basis of fundamental fairness. Assemblyman Moran sponsored the bill and he wrote a two-page letter to then Governor Lehman dated March 24, 1938 that stated: "This bill overcomes a racket wherein 'A', a beautiful young blond, married 'B', rich old fool and so conducts herself so that within three months 'B' is most anxious and very agreeable to a divorce and the payment of $200.00 weekly alimony. 'A' who is very fond of 'C' also young, wants to marry him but realizes that marriage will deprive her of the $200.00 per week. Instead of marrying 'C', she lives with him habitually as Mrs. C, and holds herself out as such. Thus both 'A' and 'C' live happily ever after on 'B' 's $200 per week. It is not fair." (Citron v. Citron, 91 Misc 2d at 791.) In Citron v. Citron, the court, while rejecting a modification, embraced the reputation based standard for concluding that a "holding out" under section 248 existed--the "outward appearance of a remarriage" was sufficient to find a "holding out" and justify possible termination of alimony. (Id.) Importantly, the court holding in Citron v. Citron supports the conclusion that the legislature never intended the "holding out" language in section 248 to require the same level of proof required to establish a common-law marriage. If the ex-spouse was "holding oneself out" as a spouse of the new friend, then the person would be married at common law and the phrase which follows "holding oneself out" in section 248"although not married to such man"--would have no meaning. The legislature's use of the "holding out" phrase in section 248 was not equivalent to the "holding out" necessary to establish a common-law marriage and the legislature must have intended some lesser proof--described in Citron v. Citron as the "outward appearance of a remarriage"--to justify the exercise of discretion to modify a maintenance award. (Id. at 787.)