In Daniels v. State of New York, UID No. 2002-001-501, Claim No. 99062, April 16, 2002, Read, P.J., the driver of defendant's vehicle, a parole officer involved in the attempted apprehension of a parole absconder, was a participant in a planned operation to apprehend the absconder. The role of the defendant's driver was to move defendant's vehicle into a position where it could block the egress of the cab containing the absconder. In that case, the claimant took the position that this was a planned operation, the taxicab was at a standstill, there was no pursuit, and this was not an emergency. The court noted that claimant "essentially asks the Court to read the word 'pursuing' in section 114-b as limited to those situations where the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle is 'pursuing' in the particular sense of 'chasing'; i.e., going swiftly after another vehicle in which an actual or suspected criminal is, in fact, fleeing" (Daniels v. State of New York, UID No. 2002-001-501, Claim No. 99062, April 16, 2002, Read, P.J.). The court went on to hold that "this Court sees no reason to qualify or narrow the meaning of the word 'pursuing' as used in Vehicle and Traffic Law 114-b. It would hardly promote the legislative purpose in forming section 1104 or public safety to deem this provision's exemption from ordinary negligence inapplicable to Contino [the parole officer operating defendant's vehicle], whose method of pursuit was, after all, aimed at short-circuiting a potentially more dangerous chase." (Id.)