In DeSimone v. South African Marine Corp., S.A. (82 AD2d 820 [2d Dept 1981]) the plaintiff suffered injuries on July 8, 1973 while working as a longshoreman loading defendant's ship. Plaintiff alleged that one of defendant's employees had negligently untied a cargo net fastened to the ship, causing it to become caught on the side of the vessel. Plaintiff alleged he had to strain in order to pull the net loose and, in so doing, sustained a heart attack. Consequently, plaintiff commenced a personal injury action against the shipowner. Plaintiff also filed a claim against his employer, International Terminal Operating Co., Inc., for disability compensation. A hearing on plaintiff's compensation claim was conducted before an Administrative Law Judge of the United States Department of Labor (the "ALJ") where plaintiff and his employer, both represented by counsel, were given a full opportunity to present evidence, oral argument, and briefs concerning the issues relative to the compensation claim. After the hearing, the ALJ, "referring specifically" to the incident, concluded that the plaintiff "did not suffer an injury arising out of the and in the course of his employment. The credible evidence is that he suffered an attack of angina at work while sitting and at rest unrelated to his work and caused by long standing arteriosclerosis." Thus, plaintiff's compensation claim was denied, and on appeal, the denial was affirmed by the Benefits Review Board of the Department of Labor. In the personal injury action, defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that (1) the Department of Labor's decision on plaintiff's compensation claim finally determined that no work-related activity on July 8, 1973 had caused plaintiff's heart attack; (2) plaintiff alleges the same injury in this suit as in the compensation proceeding and claims that work-related activity of July 8, 1973, in which defendant's negligence allegedly played a part, caused the injury; and (3) thus, since the factual issue of the cause of plaintiff's injury in this suit is identical with that already determined against him in the compensation proceeding, said prior determination will be binding and conclusive on this issue, and by reason of collateral estoppel, will preclude plaintiff from proving a necessary element of his personal injury action, viz., the causal connection between defendant's alleged negligence and plaintiff's injury. The Trial Court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, and, in effect, rejected this collateral estoppel argument. On appeal, the Second Department, recognizing the applicability of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to the quasi-judicial determination of administrative agencies, held the following: "On the record before us, there was an identity of issues and parties. The factual question of the work-related cause of plaintiff's injury had been fully and fairly litigated by plaintiff, as claimant, in the compensation proceeding, and finally determined against him upon a finding that work-related activity had not caused his injury. Therefore, barred as the same party from relitigating the same issue, and bound by the unfavorable determination of the Department of Labor, plaintiff should have been precluded by collateral estoppel from proving the cause of injury alleged in the instant complaint, viz., his work-related activity as affected by defendant's allegedly negligent conduct. As so precluded, plaintiff would have been rendered incapable of proving, prima facie, one of the necessary elements of his personal injury cause of action."