In Doe v. State of New York, 159 Misc 2d 83, 602 N.Y.S.2d 990 (Ct. Claims, 1993) the plaintiff obtained a money judgment against the defendant State of New York on June 30, 1992. An amended judgment structuring the award was entered on September 29, 1992. Both parties appealed the amended judgment. Pending the appeals, the defendant paid the claimaints $3,000,000 -- a portion of the judgment. After resolution of the appeals, a new structured judgment was entered on June 7, 1993, providing for gross awards to each plaintiff in the amount of $5,035,700 and $1,000,000. Payment was to be partly made in lump sums and partly made through periodic installments scheduled with various termination dates, but the first installment totaled $43,471.12. The amended judgment also provided, inter alia, that the county clerk was to pay plaintiffs $360,044.05 that had been held from the $3,000,000 payment that had been made earlier. The judgment also directed the defendant to pay the plaintiffs $501,585.24 in cash, representing twelve monthly payments due from July 1, 1992 through June 1, 1993, plus a per diem rate of interest on all previously unpaid amounts. On June 15, 1993, the defendant contracted with Metropolitan life insurance company (Metropolitan) to pay the future periodic installments owed. The defendant then paid the plaintiff $585,950.11 by checks mailed on June 28, 1993, representing the principal balance due and unpaid as of that date plus past periodic installments due, and interest. The annuity contracts (posted by the State and approved by the Court pursuant to CPLR 5042), provided that Metropolitan would make the periodic payments payable under the judgment commencing July 1, 1993. Due to some administrative error, however, Metropolitan did not mail the initial monthly installment check of $43,471.12 to the plaintiffs until July 6, 1993, and it was not received by the bank until July 7. The plaintiffs, therefore, sought immediate payment of the gross amount of all outstanding periodic payments without reduction to present value, pursuant to CPLR 5044. The Court, after review of the pertinent Legislative history of the statute, denied the motion. It found, pertinently, that Article 50-B does not define was constitutes a failure to make a payment in a "timely fashion" pursuant to CPLR 5044, and further, makes no reference to a court's discretion in fashioning a remedy when a petitioner has established a right to relief. Since CPLR 5044 states that a judgment creditor can seek acceleration when a payment is not timely paid "for any reason," a defendant's excuse for a delayed payment may be irrelevant. However, the Court further held that the Legislature did not intend for courts to act without reason, and in order to determine whether a payment is made in a timely fashion, a court must assess all characteristics of the payment timing and consider the debtor's efforts to fully comply with Article 50-B. "If the matter were one simply requiring a determination of proof of timing of the payment, the Legislature could have directed such application go to the clerk (see, e.g., CPLR 3215[a]), not the Judge who tried the matter (CPLR 5044)." (Id., at 88). The court in Doe went on to find that the de minimus 6-day delay in tendering the periodic monthly installment to the plaintiff did not violate Article 50-B, especially when considering the payments that the Plaintiff had already received, and would receive in the near future. Moreover, the amended judgment did not indicate that time was of the essence.