Duran v. NYCH&HC

In Duran v. NYCH&HC, 696 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Co., 1999), defendants demanded the following information regarding plaintiff's expert: areas of expertise; name and address of medical school attended and date of graduation; each hospital where the expert served an internship, residency or fellowship including the specialty and dates; each hospital in which the expert had admitting privileges; the states of licensure and states where the expert was currently practicing; the societies of which the expert was a member; board certifications; and, faculty positions. Plaintiff responded by providing only the expert's state of licensure and board certification. Justice Stanley Green, in declining to follow Jasopersaud, found that the expert disclosure was satisfactory. Granting plaintiff's motion for a protective order, Justice Green reasoned that "by using the information provided in an expert response pursuant to Jasopersaud" defendants could easily identify plaintiff's expert simply by using LEXIS-NEXIS and inputting the very same details that defendants were seeking. Id. Moreover, the Court found that "the only search that did not enable her to narrow down the possibilities in order to identify the physician was a search using only the location of licensure and board certification." Accordingly, the Court held that "defendants' reliance on Jasopersaud is thus misplaced, considering the current state of the Internet and the resources available to counsel." Id. (Justice Green also addressed, and distinguished, the 1995 First Department decision where the Court directed plaintiff to divulge to defendants their expert's medical school, residency and fellowships, and states of licensure. See, Yablon v. Coburn, 219 A.D.2d 560, 631 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1st Dept. 1995). "The demands, in dispute are proper inquiries bearing upon the qualifications of the expert, the need for which outweighs the unlikelihood that the information would allow identification of the expert's name." Id. Justice Green correctly reasoned that "the Court, by its use of the word 'unlikelihood' indicated that it based its opinion on its belief that the information provided would not lead to disclosure of the expert's identity." (Duran at 796.)