In Garza v. 508 West 112th Street, Inc. (22 Misc3d 920 [Sup Ct New York County 2008]) the issue was whether the lease included plaintiffs' right to use the exterior area ("EA"), and if so, were the terms of the use of the EA a revocable license or an required service under the RSC. The court held that the EA was a "roof terrace," and consequently a terrace, within the meaning of the lease and lease renewals, and that plaintiffs' use of the terrace was intended to be ancillary to the tenancy of the combined apartment and was not a revocable license. The Court's conclusion was based on (1) the 1989 lease read in conjunction with the 1982 lease, (2) representations made to the tenant at the time she signed the 1982 lease, (3) the tenant's and her families' exclusive use of the EA, (4) the configured access to the EA through doorways located in the combined apartment and (5) the fact that the owner knew and condoned plaintiffs' exclusive use of the EA. Notably, the Court's conclusion was first based on its consideration of the ambiguous terms of two leases. The Court explained that the 1982 lease expressly referred to a "roof terrace," and provided that its use "was subject to the owner's approval." The 1989 lease, however, did not contain a "parallel reference to a 'roof terrace,'" but referred to the demised premises as including 'a terrace, if any' thereby including the roof terrace that the parties understood to exist at the time. The Court then continued, noting "additional supportive evidence" in form of the parties' conduct, that the parties intended to grant plaintiffs exclusive personal use of the EA in the 1989 lease and renewal leases. The Court explained that the tenants had exclusive access from two doors from within the interior of the combined apartment; the third point of access to the EA was through a common vestibule alarmed door, for which only plaintiffs and the owner had a key. Plaintiffs' use of the EA over the years was open, and to the exclusion of all the other occupants residing in the building, which was made clear when the owner installed an alarmed door in the common vestibule, effectively prohibiting anyone other than plaintiffs and the owner from having access to the EA. The prior owner clearly knew about plaintiffs' exclusive use of the EA over the years, had conversations about the type of furniture permitted on the roof, and attended parties hosted by one of said tenants on the roof. In rejecting the owner's contention that the EA was a revocable license, the Court noted that the 1982 lease expressly made the use of the roof terrace subject to landlord's approval, and that such language was consistent with the notion of a license. However, the Court noted, "That operative language . . . was completely omitted in 1989" and such omission was "consistent with an interpretation that use of EA as a terrace was part of the lease of the demised premises."