In Decicco v. City of Syracuse, (68 AD3d 1771, 890 N.Y.S.2d 850 [4th Dept 2009]), plaintiffs commenced an action against the City of Syracuse on March 20, 2008 seeking damages as a result of an incident on December 20, 2006. The Decicco plaintiffs commenced the action one year and three months after the date of loss. The City of Syracuse then moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action was commenced one year and 91 days after the date of the incident and, therefore, pursuant to General Municipal Law 50-i, it was time-barred by one day. The Supreme Court denied defendant's motion and applied General Construction Law 58 to calculate the General Municipal Law 50-i limitation period. It held that February 29, 2008 should not be counted as part of the 90-day period; therefore, the action was not time-barred. In reversing the lower court's decision, the Fourth Department held that the statute required counting the one-year period independently of the 90-day period. It found that the one-year period was governed by General Construction Law 58, however, the 90-day period was not. Rather, the Court held that the 90-day period was governed by General Construction Law 20, which requires a calculation of the "number of calendar days exclusive of the calendar day from which the reckoning is made." (See also Bacalokonstantis v. Nichols, 141 AD2d 482, 529 N.Y.S.2d 111 [2nd Dept 1988]).