In In re Benjamin L. (92 N.Y.2d 660) the respondent was arrested for attempted robbery and menacing on July 7, 1994. On the following day, a pre-petition detention application was filed with the Family Court pursuant to Family Court Act 307.4 and the Court denied the application and released the respondent to the custody of his mother upon condition that he observe a curfew ( Fam. Ct. Act 307.4 [4]). No further court action occurred until August 2, 1995 when the County Attorney filed a juvenile delinquency petition against the respondent for the July 7, 1994 incident. Respondent moved for dismissal of the petition and the motion was denied. The Family Court subsequently adjudicated respondent to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him under probation supervision for a period of one year. The Court of Appeals found that "in light of the need for swift and certain adjudication at all phases of a delinquency proceeding . . . the speedy trial protections afforded under the Due Process Clause are not for criminal proceedings alone and are not at odds with the goals of juvenile delinquency proceedings" (92 N.Y.2d, at 668). The Court held that a juvenile's motion for dismissal of a petition upon speedy trial grounds should be evaluated through consideration of the five factors set forth in People v. Taranovich (37 N.Y.2d 442) which are applicable to constitutional speedy trial claims raised in criminal prosecutions (Matter of Benjamin L., at 668).