In Jack A. Corcoran Marble Co. Inc. v. Clark Construction Corp., 153 Misc. 2d 49, 597 N.Y.S.2d 259 [App Term 1st Dept 1993]) the defendant, Clark Construction Co., was hired by a homeowner named Heller's, who was not a party to the litigation, to do substantial renovation work at Heller's residential apartment. The defendant, in turn contracted with Corcoran Marble Co. to install marble floors and walls. When the defendant failed to pay Corcoran Marble, Corcoran Marble brought suit. The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) failure to state a cause of action, based upon plaintiff's failure to plead pursuant to CPLR 3015(e), that he had a home improvement license within the New York City Administrative Code. The lower court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint and the plaintiff appealed. The Appellate Term, First Department reversed the lower court and held that the defendant was not a member of the class of individuals that was intended to be protected by the Code, namely "owners". Noting the arguably broad statutory definition of that term, the Court explained: "The use of the phrase 'any other person' in Section 20-386(4) follows words of specific import, namely 'homeowner, condominium unit owner, tenant', making application of the rule of ejusdem generis appropriate. This rule of statutory construction requires the court to limit general language of a statute or ordinance by specific phrases which precede it (McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, 239, at 407-411).As the specific words appearing in subdivision 4 refer to persons who possess a proprietary or rental interest in the affected residential premises, it is proper to so limit its meaning and exclude from the protective scope of the ordinance an entity such as the defendant which itself was hired as a contractor to perform a home improvement". The Court in Corcoran then went on to state: "It is clear from the definitional language employed that the person seeking to invoke the license requirements of the ordinance must actually reside in the dwelling unit in which the work is to be performed (see, Ayres v. Dunhill Interiors, Ltd., 138 A.D.2d 303, 526 N.Y.S.2d 440), and that an agreement between two (non-resident) contractors is not among the species of contracts whose enforcement the ordinance is designed to proscribe" (Corcoran Marble Co. Inc. v. Clark Construction Corp., 153 Misc. 2d 49, supra).