In Jones v. Beame (45 NY2d 402 [1978]), the cause of action for a summary inquiry into the conditions of the City zoos was part of a larger complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief brought by private persons and organizations concerned with the generally inadequate treatment of animals in municipal zoos as a result of New York City's then fiscal crisis. The Court dismissed the complaint, stating that plaintiffs, no matter how sincerely motivated, could neither utilize the courts to intervene in the fiscal choices made by the City, nor assume the management or operation of administrative agencies. The appellate decisions in Jones (supra) provide little guidance for addressing the questions presented here. While the trial court in Jones sustained as viable the cause of action for a summary inquiry pursuant to New York City Charter 1109 (86 Misc 2d 832, 842-843), the claim was never separately addressed by the Appellate Division, First Department (56 AD2d 778 [1977]), or even mentioned by the Court of Appeals (45 NY2d 402 [1978], supra). The thrust of both appellate decisions, under the doctrines of standing or justiciability, was that the "judicial process is not designed to or intended to assume the management and operation of the executive enterprise." ( Jones v. Beame, 45 NY2d, at 408.) Even if that holding were treated as limiting the scope of section 1109 in some circumstances, it has no application here, where the summary inquiry is sought with respect to allegations of specific misconduct in relation to specific statutory provisions. (See Jones v. Beame, 56 AD2d, at 779.)