In Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch. (344 F2d 294 [2d Cir 1965, Friendly, J.]), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that limited partners could sue on a partnership's behalf. For the Second Circuit, the absence of a statutory provision was not decisive because the court found no "clear mandate against limited partners' capacity to bring an action like this" (id. at 298). The Court agreed with the holding of Klebanow in Riviera Congress Assoc. v. Yassky (18 NY2d 540, 547, 223 NE2d 876, 277 NYS2d 386 [1966, Fuld, J.]), relying, as had Chancellor Walworth long before, on an analogy with the law of trusts: "There can be no question that a managing or general partner of a limited partnership is bound in a fiduciary relationship with the limited partners ... and the latter are, therefore, cestuis que trustent.... It is fundamental to the law of trusts that cestuis have the right, 'upon the general principles of equity' (Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch.222, 232) and 'independently of [statutory] provisions' (Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 88 N. Y. 52, 59), to sue for the benefit of the trust on a cause of action which belongs to the trust if 'the trustees refuse to perform their duty in that respect'. (Western R. R. Co. v. Nolan, 48 N. Y. 513, 518 ... .)" After Klebanow and Riviera were decided, the Partnership Law was amended to provide for derivative actions by limited partners (see Partnership Law 115-a [1]). In Klebanow, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, even in the absence of statutory authorization, a limited partner in a dissolved firm had capacity to sue on behalf of the partnership (i.e., derivatively) for injury arising out of conduct proscribed by the antitrust law where the partnership and the liquidating partner had disabled themselves or had a conflict of interest, rendering futile any demand for the partnership to sue. The court reasoned that this was so because a limited partner was more like a shareholder (especially a preferred holder), or perhaps a cestui que trust, than a creditor. The District Court Judge had dismissed the complaint principally on the ground that a limited partner was a creditor rather than an owner, and that the antitrust laws do not allow a creditor to bring a treble damages suit against third parties who have allegedly injured the firm (see 232 F Supp 965 [SD NY 1964]).