In Layne v. Drouillard (65 AD3d 1197, 885 N.Y.S.2d 540 [2d Dept 2009]), the panel split 3-2 on whether the defendants met their prima facie burden. With three sentences, the three-judge majority concluded that the burden was met: "The defendants' examining doctors set forth, in their affirmed medical reports, that the plaintiff had a full range of motion in his cervical and lumbar spine based on objective range of motion tests, wherein the numerical findings were compared to what is normal. In addition, the defendants submitted deposition testimony of the plaintiff showing that the plaintiff resumed his duties as a New York City Police Officer, passed medical and physical examinations, and attended the police academy to become a police officer in another jurisdiction. During this time, the plaintiff engaged in rigorous activities which included running, sit-ups, and push-ups." (Id. at 1197-98.) The two-judge minority disagreed. The dissent noted that one of the defendants' doctors "found that the plaintiff had a lateral range of motion in his lumbar spine of 45 degrees and that 45 degrees was normal," whereas another of defendants' doctors "found that the plaintiff had a range of motion of 25 degrees in his lumbar spine and that 25 degrees was normal." (See id. at 1198 (Spolzino, J. and Angiolillo, J., dissenting.) As the dissent saw it, "the defendant's [sic] experts agreed only on the conclusion that the plaintiff's range of motion was normal, and "[a] conclusory statement that a plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury . . . is insufficient to sustain summary judgment dismissing the complaint for lack of serious injury." (See id. at 1198-99.) The majority does not address the dissent, perhaps because the only finding discussed by the dissent was on lateral bending of the lumbar spine, or because of the additional evidence that was submitted to show that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury, or both. In any event, those factors easily distinguish Layne v. Drouillard from this case. Moreover, the concerns expressed by the dissent are consistent with other Second Department authority, including the authority requiring quantified range-of-motion findings compared to "normal." In Sirma v. Beach (59 A.D.3d 611, 873 N.Y.S.2d 702 [2d Dept 2009]), the court held that summary judgment was precluded where one set of defendants made a prima facie showing with the affirmation of an examining orthopedist, but another set of defendants submitted the affirmation of an orthopedist that disclosed limitations in the range of motion of the plaintiff's lumbar spine (see id. at 613.)