In Leader v Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 276 AD2d 194 [2d Dept 2000], affd 97 NY2d 95 [2001] the Appellate Division, Second Department, granted leave to serve process in the interest of justice almost eight months after the applicable statute of limitations had expired where failure to serve in the time required was due to counsel's mistaken belief that the original version of CPLR 306-b (under which service in the case would have been timely) was still in effect. The Court reasoned that dismissal of the action for this reason would have barred a new action on statute of limitations grounds, and that, under the facts of the case, "liberality would seem particularly appropriate as no more than 240 days have elapsed since the expiration of the Statute of Limitations" and plaintiff's service of process would have been timely under the original version of CPLR 306-b. (Id. at 200.) In Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d 95 (2001), the Court of Appeals articulated that a deter-mination as to whether to grant an extension of time under the " interest of justice" standard of CPLR 306-b is a discretionary determination requiring: "a careful judicial analysis of the factual setting of the case and a balancing of the competing interests presented by the parties. Unlike an extension request premised on good cause, a plaintiff need not establish reasonably diligent efforts at service as a threshold matter. However, the court may consider diligence, or lack thereof, along with any other relevant factor in making its determination, including expiration of the Statute of Limitations, the meritorious nature of the cause of action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a plaintiffs request for the extension of time, and prejudice to defendant." (Id. at 105-106.)