In Marsh v. Smyth, 12 AD3d 307 [2004] the court reasoned that "in circumstances such as these, the question of whether the challenged testimony is admissible should not involve weighing the number of experts that concur in the expert's opinion against the number that do not, or independently deciding on the soundness of the competing experts' views. Rather, the challenge should only be successful where the challenged theory of causation finds no objective support, and instead is based solely upon the expert's own unsupported beliefs. Accordingly, the court's concern must be limited to making sure that within the scientific field in question there is a substantive, demonstrable, objective basis for the expert's conclusion. The appropriate question for the court at such a hearing is the somewhat limited question of whether the proffered expert opinion properly relates existing data, studies or literature to the plaintiff's situation or whether, instead, it is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert' [see General Electric v. Joiner, 522 US 136 (1997)]," (Marsh, 12 AD3d at 312). Moreover, the focus of the inquiry should not be upon how widespread the theory's acceptance is, but instead upon whether a "reasonable quantum of legitimate support exists in the literature for the expert's views" (id.). Nor, need the underlying support for the theory of causation "consist of cases or studies considering circumstances exactly parallel to those under consideration in the litigation. It is sufficient if a synthesis of various studies or cases reasonably permits the conclusion reached by the plaintiff's expert" (12 AD3d at 312-313.)