In Matter of Cooper v. Sheindlin, 154 A.D.2d 288 (1st Dept. 1989), lv. denied, 75 N.Y.2d 705 (1990), a defendant who was charged with two counts of second-degree murder in state court sought dismissal of the indictment on the ground that it violated his right against double jeopardy because he was previously charged in Federal Court with violating RICO, and two of the acts of racketeering in that matter were the same murder counts that he faced in state court. (See Cooper, supra.) Relying on CPL 40.20 (2) (a) , and 40.50 (9), the Court held that neither double jeopardy nor the provisions of CPL 40.20 are violated "since the Federal RICO statute and State homicide statute have substantially different elements and are clearly distinct crimes." (Id. at 289.) The First Department further held: To convict someone of a violation of . . . RICO, . . . the government must prove, inter alia, the existence of an "enterprise" ( 18 U.S.C. 1961[4]) as well as a pattern of "racketeering activity" (18 USC 1961[1]; see 18 USC 1962). Thus, reference to State law is only necessary to identify the type of unlawful activity in which the defendant engaged. The RICO statute does not charge the commission of the predicate crimes that comprise the pattern of racketeering activity but, rather, the furthering of a criminal enterprise by a pattern of racketeering activity (see United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1014 [5th Cir. 1981], cert. denied, sub nom., Meinster v. United States, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S. Ct. 2965, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1354 [1982], sub nom., Meinster v. U.S., 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S. Ct. 2965, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1354, sub nom., Platshorn v. United States, 459 U.S. 906, 103 S. Ct. 208, 74 L. Ed. 2d 166 [1982]). 2 Consequently, a defendant may be punished both for a violation of the Federal RICO statute as well as for the predicate crimes that constitute the pattern of racketeering activity . . . since these acts constitute completely separate and distinct crimes under New York law. (Id.)