In Matter of Dashawn W., 21 NY3d 36 (2013) the Court of Appeals examined its jurisprudence on "depraved indifference" crimes. They noted that in criminal matters, the Court has required the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt a heightened mens rea in order for a defendant to be found guilty under a theory of depraved indifference. But the Court specifically held that the case law "under the Penal Law has no bearing on whether a child is severely abused within the meaning of the Social Services Law." Id. at 49. On a related note, the Court held that "the agency opposing disclosure must demonstrate a substantial and realistic potential of the requested material for the abusive use against the officer." (Id. at 159.) At the same time, however, the Court noted that "in a close case, the status and purpose of the applicant may have some relevancy in determining the risk of oppressive utilization of the materials sought," and that disclosure for uses that would respect the legislative intent of Civil Rights Law 50-a "could be attained either by a restrictive formulation of the FOIL request itself, or through redaction by the agency having custody of the records, tailored in either case so as to preclude use in personal attacks against an officer." (Daily Gazette, 93 NY2d at 159.) In any event, the Court ultimately denied petitioners' request, finding that because petitioners sought "comprehensive access to all records of the disciplinary action taken against the 18 police officers, including their identities and individual punishments, for possibly very serious misconduct," the request itself demonstrated the risk of its use to embarrass or humiliate the officers involved. (Daily Gazette, 93 NY2d at 159.) The Court of Appeals clarified the meaning of "depraved indifference to human life" under the Social Services Law 384-b(8)(a)(i). The Dashawn W. Court drew a distinction between the definition of depraved indifference under the Penal Law and depraved indifference under child protective statutes. The Court noted that under the Penal Law, a crime requiring proof of an intent to kill can never be committed with depraved indifference. Furthermore, the Court noted, in the criminal context, that it is only in a few rare circumstances where a defendant may be convicted of depraved indifference murder in a one-on-one situation, however acts of child abuse necessarily involve one-on-one violence. The Court emphasized that the Social Services Law definition provides that a child can be found to be severely abused as a result of reckless or intentional acts of the parent. The Dashawn W. Court ultimately held the following: In short, our depraved indifference jurisprudence under the Penal Law has no bearing on whether a child is severely abused within the meaning of Social Services Law 384-b(8)(a)(i). For purposes of that statute "circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life" refers to the risk intentionally or recklessly posed to the child by the parent's abusive conduct. Id. at 49.